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Three million children were subjects of at least one abuse or neglect report in the United States 
in 2009. When legal cases result from these reports, child testimony is usually the only source of 
prosecuting evidence. If there is a question about a child’s ability to provide legal testimony, his 
or her testimonial competence may be assessed. When the presiding judge deems a child 
incompetent, the child is not allowed to testify, or if the child’s status is unclear, the judge may 
provide a warning to the jury about giving less weight to the testimony. However, there are only 
skeletal legal guidelines in place to aid judges in these decisions and there is little empirical 
research in this area. The present study was designed to assess new techniques for determining 
children’s testimonial competence. Sixty-four 3 to 5-year-old children completed sections of the 
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence- Third Edition (WPPSI-III), the Test of 
Language Development- Primary- Fourth Edition (TOLD-P-4), the Child Memory Scale (CMS), 
and the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC) and answered questions designed to 
approximate the types of questions typically asked in competency hearings. Children also 
participated in a series of staged events with a confederate and were interviewed about the staged 
events immediately and after a delay of several days. Children’s performance on the WPPSI-III, 
CMS, and VSSC predicted the ratio of correct to incorrect details children provided about the 
staged events at the delayed interview. Analyses comparing children who had accuracy ratios 
above 1 to those with accuracy ratios of 1 or below showed that children who gave more correct 
information than incorrect information scored higher on every language and memory variable 
and were less likely to yield to suggested items on the VSSC.  Implications for the legal system 
are discussed.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
History of Children’s Legal Testimony 
In the 1980’s and 1990’s there was a dramatic increase in the prosecution of child abuse 
cases in the United States. This was partially due to an increased awareness of the seriousness 
and prevalence of crimes against children (Hall & Sales, 2008), and partially due to increasing 
confidence in young children’s ability to provide testimony (Child Victims and Child Witnesses 
Rights Act, 1990). While there is some evidence that abuse reports are declining (Finkelhor & 
Jones, 2006), 3 million children, or 40.3 out of every 1,000 children, were subjects of abuse or 
neglect reports in 2009 and many of these children were subjects of multiple reports.  In one fifth 
of these reports there was evidence of maltreatment (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2009). Because maltreatment cases often rely on child testimony as the primary source 
of evidence, the legal system should have a vested interest in determining which children’s 
testimony should be admitted and believed (Ceci & Bruck, 1995).  
In the literature on child development, children’s believability is usually decided by 
measuring the objective accuracy of a child’s report. In the legal context, there is often no 
empirical evidence with which to directly assess accuracy. Therefore, inferences about a child’s 
accuracy are made at two levels. At the first level the trial judge must decide whether a child’s 
testimony should be admissible. To do this, he or she determines whether the testimony is 
reliable and, in some cases, whether the witness is competent.  Legally, reliability is defined 
broadly and refers to all potential evidence, including testimony (Rosenthal, 2002). To consider 
evidence reliable, there must be reason to believe that it is what it purports to be. In the case of 
testimony the judge must decide that the witness had the opportunity to witness what he or she 
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 purports to have witnessed and that the witness’s testimony was not tampered with through 
coaching or suggestion. Testimonial competence refers to whether or not a witness has the 
cognitive ability to provide useful testimony. Testimonial competency guidelines are set in both 
federal and state law and competency decisions are made by the presiding judge (Myers, 1997).  
If testimony is determined reliable and the child providing the testimony is either 
assumed to be competent or deemed to be competent by the judge, it is up to the court to 
determine the child’s credibility. Credibility is the court’s opinion about whether or not a child’s 
testimony is believable. Therefore, reliability, competency, and credibility are all components of 
determining accuracy in a context in which there is question about how the original event 
unfolded. The present work focuses on the determination of a child’s testimonial competency. 
This is a complex legal issue that has received little empirical attention.  
In the landmark 1779 decision of The King v. Brasier, the defendant was accused of 
assault with intent to rape a young girl, Marry Harris, who was under seven years of age at the 
time of the alleged attack. This early ruling gained widespread acceptance for its determination 
that whether a child may testify at trial should not be based on a minimum age but rather on the 
child’s ability to take the oath, which in turn depends on an assessment of the child’s 
understanding of the importance of telling the truth.  
The King v. Brasier dictum was later elaborated in the 1895 Supreme Court case of 
Wheeler v. U.S. In this case a 5 year old boy was the only witness to a murder, and the case 
could not be decided without his testimony. The judge ruled that the boy’s testimony was 
admissible because he was both sufficiently intelligent to serve as a witness and because he 
demonstrated the ability to distinguish between truths and lies, and the understanding that he 
was morally obligated to tell the truth. These standards were further elaborated so that in many 
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 states the competency standard now requires that a witness be able to 1) understand and answer 
simple questions, 2) observe and recall events pertinent to a case, 3) understand the difference 
between the truth and a lie, and 4) understand that they are morally obligated to tell the truth on 
the stand. Though the first of these standards, the ability to understand and answer simple 
interview questions, is the only explicit federal competency standard (Child Victims and Child 
Witnesses Rights Act, 1990).  
Historically, courts have moved between extremes of allowing child testimony. 
Previously, children were not allowed to testify as witnesses because they were not believed 
competent as a group. However, today children as young as three years of age are presumed 
competent in most courts unless a particular child’s competence is brought into question in a 
case (Child Victims and Child Witnesses Rights Act, 1990; Myers, 1992). According to Rule 
601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, age alone may not be considered a compelling reason to 
question a person’s competency. If a child’s competence is in question the trial judge can probe 
that child’s competence in the presence of the jury. If a child seems particularly incompetent this 
could result in a competency hearing with only the judge, lawyers, and a supportive adult for the 
welfare of the child present. The judge can also request counsel from a psychologist or social 
worker, but the final decision is made by the judge (Gershman, 2001; Myers, 1997).  
While competency hearings have become less common, trial judges make other legal 
decisions which previously would have fallen into the category of competency determination 
(Myers, 1986-1987). For example, a trial judge can exclude a child’s testimony because it is not 
relevant or because the child lacks sufficient “personal knowledge” of the case. The judge can 
also decide to reserve a child’s testimony and use it only if it is necessary to the case.   These 
alternate decisions are legal even given Rule 601, but they can be used to reach the same end of 
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 excluding a child’s testimony because of perceived incompetence. In short, competency 
decisions are more ubiquitous than they seem at first glance because legal loopholes allow judges 
to make competency decisions without official competency hearings.   
No matter which legal mechanism is used to exclude a child’s testimony, the final 
decision is always made by a judge, who often has no special training involving children or 
developmental research (Cashmore & Bussey, 1996; Myers, 1992). To compound this issue, 
there are no empirically validated tests of testimonial competence currently used in courts 
(Cashmore & Bussey, 1996; Seton Hall L. Review, 2010). In fact, as will be discussed in detail 
below, there are few standards for the administration of competency exams and consequently, 
there are few studies examining the predictive value of these exams. What little research there is 
suggests that current exams are not predictive of the quality of children’s testimony.  
Previous Research on Testimonial Competence 
There have been some efforts to develop reliable tests of children’s competence. In an 
unpublished pilot, Hansen (1990) designed a functional test of two components of competency 1) 
understanding of the obligation of an oath and 2) sufficient intelligence and capacity. The test 
was piloted on a non-representative sample of 17 children including 1st-4th graders, and 7th 
graders. The test had high inter-rater reliability and high internal consistency on all measures. 
However, attempts at external validity were not successful, and the pilot did not include 
measures of predictive validity.  
Lyon and Saywitz (1999, 2000) have developed a theoretically reliable test of children’s 
knowledge of truths and lies and understanding of the distinction between truths and lies. For 
each task children are presented with four images with accompanying stories. For example, to 
test children’s knowledge of the distinction between the truth and a lie, children see an image of 
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 two children who are looking at a truck. Speech bubbles above the children’s heads indicate that 
one child says that the truck is a truck and the other child says it is an airplane. Participants are 
then asked which child is telling the truth. This is repeated four times, each with different 
scenarios.  
The process for testing understanding of the consequences of lying is quite similar. 
Participants are shown images in which two children are standing in front of an adult authority 
figure. For example, in one scenario, they both stand in front of a judge. Children are told that 
one of the children told the truth to the judge and the other child told a lie to the judge and are 
then asked which child would likely get into trouble. Children’s passing scores require that they 
answer questions about all four scenarios correctly.  These tests are useful because they reduce 
children’s reliance on language and passing scores on the tests mean that children scored 
significantly above chance because they respond to four different scenarios rather than a single 
yes-no question.  
Understanding and Answering Simple Interview Questions 
When a child’s testimonial competence is called into question, their ability to understand 
and answer simple interview questions is generally assessed through a short interview with the 
presiding judge with or without council or jury present (Myers, 1997). The problem, however, is 
that as basic as this competency may seem, the ability to effectively communicate in a legal 
setting is extremely complex, and can be challenging even for competent children (Saywitz & 
Goodman, 1996; Saywitz, Snyder, & Nathanson, 1999; Walker, 1993).  
Walker (1993) has analyzed court transcripts with an eye to the linguistic complexities 
involved in a standard case involving child witnesses. Her findings illustrate that the language 
used in court is “informal, illogical, ungrammatical… full of blunders and grievous errors and 
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 mutations… and characterized by endless sentences, false starts… and other crudities” (Walker, 
1985, p. 115). Walker provides a detailed case analysis in which she examines the full court 
transcripts from interviews with a 5-year-old girl. She gives concrete examples of instances of 
semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic complexity that are far beyond the developmental level of a 
preschool-aged child. In a particularly dramatic example of syntactic complexity, the girl was 
asked “Do you also recall driving in a car a day or two after Doug-you found out that Doug-that 
something had happened to him and telling and pointing out houses as being the place where the 
people or one of the people who hurt Doug lived” (p. 68). As phrased, many adults would likely 
have difficulty unpacking the intent and providing a meaningful response, and research has 
demonstrated that young children have more trouble understanding the language of the 
courtroom than do adults (Saywitz, Goodman, & Lyon, 2002).  
When the language of the interview is developmentally inappropriate or too complex for 
a particular child, children are more likely to assent to an interviewer’s question. Fritzley and 
Lee (2003) asked preschool-aged children questions that were answerable, and questions that 
were nonsensical to see whether they would respond in predictable ways. Overall, children rarely 
answered “I don’t know” to the nonsensical questions, and the youngest children exhibited a 
tendency to acquiesce to the experimenter. This finding suggests that perhaps limitations in 
language skills and vocabulary constrain children’s abilities to answer questions that contain 
advanced language and may lead children to falsely assent to an interviewer.  In keeping with 
this, children’s overall language abilities are often correlated with decreased suggestibility (see 
Bruck & Melnyk, 2004 for a review).  
The developmentally inappropriate language used in court makes it difficult for any child 
to provide reliable testimony, no matter what their relative competence at understanding and 
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 answering questions may be. However, competency examinations may still be helpful in 
determining which children can provide quality testimony, and to what degree, in instances 
where they are asked developmentally appropriate questions. In addition, competency 
determinations could potentially guide well-trained forensic interviewers to ask questions at 
appropriate levels of complexity in interviews that occur outside of court. Children with low 
language scores may require interviewers to be particularly mindful of the vocabulary and 
structure used in interview questions. These interviews can be critical pieces of evidence in cases 
involving child witnesses and in some cases out of court testimony may be the only evidence 
from a child witness (see Hall & Sales, 2008). A reliable measure of competency may be 
particularly important because as will be discussed below, often the children who seem 
competent and sound credible are not accurate.  
Validly and reliably determining individual differences in children’s abilities to 
understand and answer simple interview questions is a daunting task. Children are often 
interviewed by professionals with experience interviewing children at some point in the pre-trial 
process, and these professionals are advised in the literature to make note of children’s 
communicative abilities (ex: Myers, 1992, p. 52). However, these evaluations are merely 
recommendations to the judge, and are not necessarily deciding factors in a child’s competency 
determination.  The guidelines for judicial competency examinations are also extremely open-
ended. Although judges have the responsibility to assess a child’s ability to understand and 
answer questions, they are not given specific questions or tests to administer. Cashmore and 
Bussey (1996) found that there was a wide range of techniques used by judges to determine 
competency. While this study was conducted with Australian judges and magistrates, the 
competency guidelines are quite similar between Australia and the United States. Because there 
7 
 
 is no standard test of children’s communicative competency to be used in legal settings, we are 
limited in determining the validity of these tests, and communicative competency determinations 
are not likely to be reliable. Courts are in need of a practical, valid, and reliable test of 
communicative competency.  
Observing and Recalling Important Events and Information 
Research on children’s general memory skills has demonstrated that in some ways, young 
children’s memory is quite impressive (e.g. Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Saywitz, 
Goodman, Nicholas, & Moan, 1991). The memory system is online from even before birth 
(DeCasper & Spence, 1986), and infants can retain information even over long-periods (Shields 
& Rovee-Collier, 1992). By the early preschool years children are even able to organize their 
memories of personally-experienced events into cohesive narrative reports (Fivush, Haden, & 
Adam, 1995; Newcombe & Reese, 2004). However, buried within these generalities are 
pronounced individual differences; the memory process develops slowly and does not reach adult 
levels until adolescence for most children, though earlier for some and later for others (ex: 
Greenhoot, Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, 1999).  
One limitation early in memory development is that young children’s memory reports 
contain fewer details on average than those of adults (e.g., Leippe, Romanczyk, Manion, 1991). 
These differences come about because of early limitations in processing speed as well as 
limitations in children’s knowledge. Limitations in processing speed can hamper memory at both 
encoding and retrieval. At encoding, processing speed affects how much information gets into 
the system because the longer it takes to encode, the less likely it is that the information will 
make it into storage (Hale, 1990; Kail, 2007; Kail & Ferrer, 2007). Limitations in processing 
speed can also result in limitations in the volume of information retrieved. Because children 
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 spend more cognitive resources trying to retrieve information, they tend to retrieve less than 
adults (Kail, 1986).  
Limitations in children’s knowledge base have also been demonstrated to hamper the 
amount of relevant information they are able to successfully encode, store and retrieve. Children 
have a different understanding than adults of which information is important and relevant. For 
example, while an adult is likely somewhat familiar with which pieces of information would be 
critical to provide when they are a witness in a criminal case, children are less likely to have 
legal knowledge (Saywitz & Goodman, 1996; Saywitz & Snyder, 1993). These differences in 
perception shape what children attend to when they witness events, which consequently shapes 
what they are able to retrieve. Perception of which information is important later shapes which 
information children decide to retrieve.  
In a similar vein, children’s knowledge of scripts--general knowledge of reoccurring 
events--plays a role in how they perceive and remember events. Familiarity with the elements of 
an event, or having a sense of the typical sequence of a witnessed event, contributes significantly 
to the interpretation and consequent memory for an event. Pillemer, Picariello, and Pruett (1994) 
interviewed children who had just experienced a fire drill at their school. Younger children, who 
were less familiar with the sequence of events common to fire drills, were more likely to make 
mistakes about the sequencing of events. For example, they were more likely to claim that they 
evacuated their classrooms before they heard the alarm. Older children did not make these types 
of mistakes. Thus, with experience, the number of spontaneous inaccurate statements decreased 
and the number of correct statements increased.  
Another type of knowledge that can influence memory is metamemory knowledge. As 
children develop knowledge about how memory works and which strategies they can use to help 
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 them remember, they remember more. The first strategy to develop is rehearsal, which involves 
mentally or verbally repeating to-be-remembered information to retain it in memory. Next is 
organization which entails rearranging information in a meaningful way to aid in retention. The 
final strategy to develop is elaboration in which information and structure is added to make a 
cohesive story out of the to-be-remembered information. These strategies do not develop one 
after another in a consistent trajectory, but overlap while children learn the memory benefits of 
each strategy and learn to use them efficiently (Siegler, 1996). As children begin using 
increasingly effective strategies there are resulting increases in memory abilities (Beuhring & 
Kee, 1987; Shlagmuller & Schneider, 2002). Complicating matters still further, research shows 
that the components of metamemory are affected by the child’s representational knowledge: 
earlier competence is seen in domains in which the child has elaborate knowledge (Ceci, Fitneva, 
& Williams, 2010). 
Children not only become better at remembering more accurate information over time, 
but they also remember a higher ratio of accurate to inaccurate information over time. Beuscher 
and Roebers (2005) tested 6, 8, and 10 year old children’s memories about a brief video one 
week after its presentation.  They found that the number of correct responses about the video 
increased with age and that the 6 year olds included a higher proportion of false details into their 
reports than either of the older age groups. Further, older children were more likely to respond “I 
don’t know” when they were asked leading questions for which “I don’t know” was the most 
appropriate answer. The authors also tested whether children could effectively utilize social 
information to monitor their reports for accurate information. Half the children were told that the 
experimenter was not knowledgeable about the video prior to the interview. If children 
understood that the experimenter had no special knowledge, and could successfully use this 
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 information to monitor their memories, then they should have been less influenced by any 
unanswerable questions the experimenter asked. However, the information made no difference in 
the accuracy of children’s reports. The authors suggest that this null finding implies that young 
children have difficulties in monitoring their memories based on a social “warning”.  
Finally, susceptibility to suggestion can play a major part in children’s memory accuracy. 
Suggestibility refers to a wide range of factors that may influence a person’s memory report. 
Ceci and Bruck (1995) provide a comprehensive definition of suggestibility that will be the basis 
of the following discussion, “…suggestibility refers to the degree to which the encoding, storage, 
retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by internal and external factors” (p. 44).  This 
brief definition encompasses critical distinctions that are missing in classic definitions of 
suggestibility. First, suggestibility may occur at any stage of the memory process, including at 
the point of reporting the event. Second, suggestibility may occur due to either internal or 
external factors. Implicit within this definition is the understanding that unlike previous 
conceptualizations of suggestibility, the current understanding is that a child’s memory report 
may be inaccurate not only because the memory has been permanently altered (the cognitive or 
internal explanation), but it could also be because the child is making a superficial attempt to 
please the interviewer or some other interested adult (the social or external explanation).  
The cognitive and social forms of suggestion can also work in concert so that while a 
child may initially provide a false report for social reasons, the act of rehearsing the false report 
could damage the memory trace, resulting in permanent alterations of the internal memory. For 
example, a suggestive interviewing technique that is frequently used in empirical work involves 
asking children to “pretend” that an event occurred and to describe what it might be like. Often 
children begin to incorporate these initial intentionally imagined details into later memory 
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 reports (e.g. Ceci, Crottreau, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Kulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008).  A similar 
mechanism may occur for children who provide false information for personal motivations. They 
may “turn a lie into memory’s truth” (Loftus, 1992).  
Inaccurate reports can be particularly damaging in a legal setting. They may result in 
false allegations, these allegations can result in an unnecessary trial, and sometimes trials based 
on false claims can result in false convictions. Conversely, false reports may preclude trials when 
they should, in fact, be held.  A consistent finding in the literature on children’s testimony is that 
in most cases children are more vulnerable to interviewer biases than are adults (see Ceci & 
Bruck, 1995 for a review and Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008 for important exceptions).  
Age is the most robust individual difference in the suggestibility literature. This has been 
a consistent finding since early in the 20th century. William Stern (1910, cited in Ceci and Bruck, 
1993) showed images to children between the ages of 7 and 18 and asked them to memorize 
them. He then interviewed the participants with both open-ended questions and closed-ended, 
suggestive questions. He found that every age group provided more accurate responses to the 
open-ended, non-suggestive questions, but further, that there was a developmental trend so that 
the youngest children he interviewed were the most susceptible to suggestive questions about the 
pictures. This finding has been replicated more recently in varied contexts, including forensically 
relevant ones, and using varied types of suggestion. For example, Eisen, Qin, Goodman, and 
Davis (2002) found that preschool-aged children who were interviewed about an anogenital 
examination that they received as part of an ongoing abuse investigation were more susceptible 
to misleading questions than were their older counterparts (6-10yr olds and 11-14yr olds).  This 
study is forensically relevant because the participants were children who were suspected of 
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 having been abused and because they were interviewed about an event that involved intimate 
physical contact and stress.  
As discussed above, much of the early work on suggestibility, and many of the early 
definitions of suggestibility focused on contexts in which an adult manipulated a child’s memory 
report through biased techniques. The manipulation of the child’s report in these situations is 
largely subconscious for the child and this process is generally the one associated with cognitive 
alteration of the child’s memory. A cognitive change can permanently alter the child’s memory 
trace so that she no longer has access to the untainted memory of the original event. However, 
children’s reports can also be altered due to social motivations that result in an initial conscious 
decision to manipulate the memory report.  
In summary, the accuracy of a child’s report depends on several external and internal 
factors. This review has focused on developmental differences in children’s memory reports 
based on other cognitive developments such as processing speed and knowledge and contextual 
factors such as social influence and motivation to lie. Developmental differences in each of these 
factors often makes young children more vulnerable to forgetting and distortion, but identifying 
the causes of developmental differences can also inform us about potential individual differences 
in remembering and forgetting beyond age.  
As discussed above, the most consistent individual difference in memory ability and 
suggestibility is age. On average, older children and adults remember more accurate information 
and are less suggestible than are young children. However, competency decisions are not, and 
should not, be made solely on the basis of age because there are wide individual differences in 
accuracy within age groups and because in some contexts, young children are more accurate than 
young children and adults.  
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 There is limited research which explores individual differences, other than age, in 
children’s memory skills (Bauer, 2004). While it is clear that children vary considerably in their 
abilities to remember and to accurately report those memories, our ability to predict those 
differences has been limited. Research on individual differences in event memory in the 
preschool years has explored differences in gender (ex: Reese & Fivush, 1993), information 
processing (Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998), background knowledge (Goodman, Quas, Batterman-
Faunce, Riddlesberer, & Kuhn, 1994; Ornstein, Merritt, Baker-ward, Furtado, Gordon, & 
Principe, 1998), socialization (Nelson & Fivush, 2004), narrative skill (Kulkofsky, Wang, & 
Ceci, 2007, Kulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008, Nelson & Fivush, 2004), and language skills 
(Greenhoot, Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, 1999; Gordon, Ornstein, Nida, Follmer, 
Crenshaw, & Albert, 1993; Reese & Brown, 2000; Walkenfeld, 2000). However, the results have 
been mixed and the measures used to assess individual differences vary widely. Further, in a 
majority of studies the measures are associated with the number of details children report or 
recognize rather than the accuracy of the report.  
A majority of the limited research on individual differences and memory has focused on 
forensic issues like suggestibility (Bauer, 1996). For example, Leichtman and Ceci (1995) biased 
a group of children with stereotypes and interviewed the children repeatedly and suggestively to 
examine the effects on the children’s memory reports. While some children eventually 
incorporated all four suggested, stereotype-consistent items into their memory reports, some 
children resisted all attempts at suggestion. Therefore, while some children are prone to 
incorporating suggestive details, not all children are suggestible. There are also reliable tests of 
individual differences in suggestibility which indicates that susceptibility to suggestion is a 
quantifiable individual difference (Gudjonsson, 1984; 1987; Scullin & Ceci, 2001).  Bruck and 
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 Melynk (2004) published a thorough review of the literature on individual differences and 
suggestibility and found that the cognitive factors that were most consistently related to 
suggestibility were language ability and creativity.  
Secondly, there is a body of recent evidence demonstrating that in some contexts young 
children may be more accurate than their older counterparts. For example, children’s limited 
knowledge of semantic associations has been shown to limit their suggestibility when the 
suggestions concern items that are semantically related to true items. Older children and adults 
are more susceptible to these types of suggestions than are younger children who lack this 
knowledge (Brainerd & Reyna, 2007; Brainerd et al., 2008; Ceci, Papierno, & Kulkofsky, 2007). 
Therefore, younger children are not always more suggestible than older children and adults.  
In summary, while the memory system continues to develop well past the preschool 
years, young children can still provide accurate and detailed testimony. However, there is 
significant variability in preschool-aged children’s abilities to provide accurate testimony and to 
resist suggestion. Because of the breadth of individual differences in children’s abilities to recall 
events, predicting children’s competency in this domain could prove critical in order to ensure a 
fair trial. However, the determination of a child’s ability to observe and recall the events relevant 
to a case currently suffers from the same limitations in reliability and validity as the assessment 
of a child’s ability to understand and answer interview questions. Additionally, the empirical 
literature on the topic is especially limited. Judges have the freedom to determine competence 
using their own discretion and are provided with only skeletal guidelines with which to make 
those assessments. This process necessarily leads to inconsistencies in assessment (Cashmore & 
Bussey, 1996).  
Knowledge About Truth and Lies 
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 In order to provide accurate testimony children must not only meet a threshold of 
language and memory skills, they must also be motivated to provide accurate testimony- they 
must be honest. As noted by the Brasier Court in 1779, “… [children's] admissibility depends 
upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be 
collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the Court” (202-203). Research 
has amply demonstrated that young children can, and will lie to adults for multiple reasons. 
Children will sometimes lie to avoid punishment, to sustain a game, to keep a promise/protect a 
loved one, to achieve personal gain, and to avoid embarrassment (see Ceci & Bruck, 1995 for a 
review). In fact, some research paradigms rely on lying behaviors in preschool-aged children 
(London & Nunez, 2002; Talwar, Lee, Bala, and Lindsay, 2002). A paradigm used by London 
and Nunez (2002) and Talwar et al (2002) to examine contextual effects on lying behavior 
involves instructing children not to peek at a concealed object or toy when the interviewer leaves 
the room. The room is surveyed by a hidden video camera to observe children’s behaviors. In 
both studies the lying rates for the children who peeked were as high as 90%.  
The most recent area of study involving children’s competency to give testimony 
involves children’s abilities to distinguish truths from lies and children’s understanding of their 
moral obligation to tell the truth. While the debate about how early children are capable of lying 
is long-standing (Piaget, 1932), the relationship of their understanding of truth-telling and their 
truth-telling behavior has only recently been empirically tested. The research on children’s truth 
and lie competency has taken two approaches. The first is designed to assess the predictive 
power of current competency exams for children’s behavior, and the second strives to enhance 
the validity of the current exams.  
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 It appears that from an early age children have a basic grasp of what it means to tell the 
truth and an understanding that it is good to tell the truth (Pipe & Wilson, 1994). In fact, young 
children often have more rigid definitions of morality than do adults (Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 
1932). Haugaard, Repucci, Laird, and Nauful (1991) showed preschool-aged children a video in 
which a young girl is coached by her mother to lie to the police or a video in which she is not 
coached. The children were then interviewed to see whether they thought the girl lied when she 
told the police incorrect information. The authors hypothesized that because of immature 
knowledge of what it means to lie, and because of children’s susceptibility to social pressure by 
authority figures, children would not consider the false information provided by the mother as a 
lie. However, they found that even the preschoolers said that the girl was lying if she told the 
police incorrect information. It did not matter whether the girl in the video was instructed to lie 
by her mother. The authors also read children a vignette in which one child lied to protect a 
friend from punishment and they found that nearly every child (91%) agreed that saying 
something that was untrue was a lie even if it was to protect a friend.  
It has been demonstrated that if children are interviewed in an age-appropriate manner 
they can be competent at answering questions testing their understanding of the truth/lie 
distinction and their understanding of the importance of telling the truth (Pipe & Wilson, 1994). 
Interviews that are appropriate for young children reduce the need for conceptual description of 
terms and rely on concrete demonstrations of truths and lies. For example, preschool-aged 
children are generally accurate at answering questions such as “If I told you I had purple hair, 
would that be the truth or a lie”. On the other hand, young children have difficulty answering 
questions that call for abstract conceptualizations, such as “What is the difference between the 
truth and a lie”. The downside to these types of competency questions is that may underestimate 
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 young children’s appreciation of truth/lie distinctions. Children can also be accurate when 
answering simple, concrete questions about the morality of lying. For example, they are often 
accurate at answering a question such as “Is it good/bad to tell the truth/a lie” (Myers, 1997).The 
downside to these latter types of competency exams, however, is that they involve exclusively 
closed-ended and forced-choice questions, which are often more leading than the open-ended 
variety (ex: Fritzley & Lee, 2003).  
 Empirical work has failed to find a relationship with these competency tests and 
children’s lie-telling behavior. While most children are able to pass the truth and lie sections of 
legal competency exams, their performance on these exams does not predict whether they will lie 
or tell the truth. It is unclear whether this is an artifact of the methods employed to test children’s 
knowledge, or whether children’s behavior simply does not reflect their knowledge in this 
context.  
Talwar et al (2002) interviewed 3-7 year old children using hypothetical scenarios where 
either the child or an imaginary character had the opportunity to lie or tell the truth about a 
transgression. Nearly every child demonstrated knowledge of truths and lies, indicated that the 
imaginary character should not lie to conceal a transgression, and that they would not lie to 
protect themselves. However, performance on these measures did not predict truth-telling 
performance. Many of the children lied to conceal their own transgression, despite successfully 
passing the competency exam.  
For half the children Talwar et al (2002) had a conceptual discussion about lies and truths 
before children were given the opportunity to lie, and for the other half children demonstrated 
their truth- or lie-telling behavior before they had this conceptual talk with the experimenter. The 
authors found that the order of presentation did not matter. This implies that truth and lie 
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 components of competency exams do not predict behavior, and further, that having these 
conversations does not make children more truthful. However, when children promised to tell the 
truth, their truth-telling behavior increased. Therefore, Talwar et al. (2002) suggest that taking 
the oath is more likely to increase children’s truthfulness than is measuring their understanding 
of truth vs. lies, or their understanding of the morality of lying. It is also more likely to influence 
their truth-telling behavior than is having a discussion about truths and lies.  
London and Nunez (2002) similarly tested the relationship between children’s truth-
telling knowledge and performance. They found that children’s performance on competency 
exams did not predict their truth-telling behavior but that children who participated in these 
discussions were less likely to lie to experimenters about minor transgressions. Thus, neither 
Talwar et al (2002) nor London and Nunez (2002) found a relationship between truth/lie 
competency and truth-telling performance. However, there is a discrepancy in their respective 
findings concerning the benefits of truth/lie discussions. Talwar et al (2002) found that truth/lie 
discussion had no impact on children’s truth-telling behavior and London and Nunez (2002) 
found that the discussion improved children’s memory performance. This is likely because the 
truth-lie discussions in London and Nunez (2002) included requests for children to tell the truth, 
which is similar to the beneficial effect of taking the oath in the Talwar et al (2002) study. 
Therefore, it may be the case that it was the oath alone that led to increased accuracy in the 
London and Nunez (2002) results.  
Summary 
The limited data on children’s testimonial competence suggests that competency 
standards are in need of revision and refinement. I know of no research that directly assesses the 
types of questions that are typically used to measure children’s ability to understand and answer 
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 interview questions or those used to estimate children’s memory skills.  However, above I have 
reviewed evidence that individual differences exist in these domains. I have also reviewed the 
recent work on the truth and lie components of the competency exam. This data suggests that 
establishing a child’s understanding of truths and lies and morality about lying is at best 
measured inappropriately in the current system and at worst an unnecessary and misleading 
component to the exam. Instead, requiring children to take a child-friendly oath may accomplish 
more than including these components on a competency exam (McGough, 1994).  
The present study is a first step toward developing a reliable and valid exam for use in 
testimonial competency evaluations. The goals for the study were to assess whether the types of 
competency exams currently in use can predict children’s testimonial accuracy and to test 
whether an empirically informed test of competence can more robustly predict accuracy.  The 
study focuses on language and memory assessment because these are the competency 
components that have been previously neglected in the literature. Children were interviewed both 
with measures that approximate the types of questions commonly used by judges to estimate 
children’s testimonial competency and with a set of empirically validated measures selected to 
measure the same basic competencies. Individual differences in children’s competency scores 
were then compared with the accuracy of children’s testimony about a staged event.  
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  Sixty-four preschool-aged children between the ages of 32 and 68 months (M = 52.30, SD 
= 7.17, 48% female) were recruited from two schools in the central New York state area. 
Principals were contacted directly and agreed to have consent forms distributed to parents of 
preschool-aged children within each school. Children were included in the study if their parents 
agreed that they could participate and that the interviews could be audio recorded.  
Materials 
Children completed test batteries to assess language ability, memory skills, and 
suggestibility. One set of tests involved questions designed to approximate the types of items 
currently asked by judges to assess child competency. The other set of items included a battery 
of primarily normed exams and tasks used in the empirical literature.  
Forensic Battery. Interviewers engaged children in a 1-5 minute open-ended conversation 
in order to elicit as much narrative from the child as possible. Two raters who were blind to 
children’s performance on other test measures rated each child’s receptive and productive 
language abilities on a three-point Likert scale (not proficient, proficient, highly proficient) and 
specified the reasoning for their ratings. Memory was assessed through a structured interview in 
which children were asked to discuss four past events- breakfast that morning, all events from 
the previous day, the child’s last birthday, and the previous summer. First children were asked to 
provide as much information as possible and then the interviewer followed up with closed-ended 
prompts as needed (see Appendix A).  
Pilot Battery. Children’s language was also assessed with the Verbal Intelligence 
Quotient (VIQ) from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence- Third Edition 
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 (WPPSI-III) and the Relational Vocabulary and Syntactic Understanding components of the Test 
of Language Development-Primary, Fourth Edition (TOLD-P:4). The VIQ subtests for children 
between the ages of 2 years, 6 months, and 3 years, 11 months, are Receptive Vocabulary and 
Information. For children 4 years old and above, the subtests are Information, Vocabulary, and 
Word Reasoning. The younger children also completed the Vocabulary and Word Reasoning 
subtests so that their raw scores could be compared with those of the older children.  
The WPPSI-III was normed with 1700 children between the ages of 2 years, 6 months 
and 7 years, 3 months. The reliability coefficients for the subtests range from .83 to .95, and the 
test-retest reliability ranges from .84 to .92. The WPPSI-III is also considered a valid measure 
based on previous data on the WPPSI-R. Scores on subtest composites range from .74 to .90 
when compared to the WPPSI, WISC-R, Stanford Binet (4th ed.), and McCarthy Scales. There is 
also evidence of discriminant validity with the WPPSI-R. For both age groups the subtests took 
approximately 20 minutes to administer.  
All of the reliability coefficients for the subtests of the TOLD-P:4 exceed .80 as do test-
retest scores. Inter-rater reliability coefficients exceed .90. Validity was established through 
comparison with the Pragmatic Language Observation Scale, TOLD-I:4, and WISC-IV Verbal 
Composite. The TOLD-P:4 has also been shown to identify people known to have poor language 
skills. The TOLD-P:4 subtests took approximately 10-15 minutes to administer.  
Children’s memory skills were assessed with the six core subtests of the Children’s 
Memory Scale (CMS, Cohen, 1997) and an event memory task. The six CMS subtests include 
Dot Locations, Stories, Faces, Word Pairs, Number, and Sequences. The total administration 
time for the CMS is 20 minutes. The CMS has been normed with children between the ages of 5 
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 and 16 years. The average reliability coefficient is .91, test-retest reliability is .89, and inter-rater 
reliability is .94. Validity was assessed by comparison to the Wechsler.  
Children’s general event memory skills and individual differences in suggestibility were 
assessed with the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC, Scullin & Ceci, 2001; Scullin 
& Hembrooke, 1998; Scullin, Kanaya, & Ceci, 2002). The VSSC is composed of two time 
points. At the first interview children watch a brief video of a child’s birthday party. Then, after a 
delay of at least one day children are interviewed about the content of the video. First, children 
are asked non-leading open-ended questions. Next, children are asked a set of nine leading 
yes/no questions followed by the following mild negative feedback: “You missed a few of the 
questions. Let’s go through them again and see if you can do better this time”. The interviewer 
then repeats the nine leading questions. Finally, this procedure is repeated with a second set of 
nine leading yes/no questions. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the VSSC is .85 for Yield 
items and .75 for Shift items. The predictive validity of the VSSC is .62 (Warren, Scullin, & 
Ceci, 2000). The open-ended section was used as an assessment of children’s event memory and 
the closed-ended section was used as a measure of children’s susceptibility to suggestion.  
Procedure 
All 64 children were interviewed four times. The first two interviews were spaced an 
average of 3.09 (SD = 2.37) days apart so that there was a delay between the target event and the 
memory test (described below). The third and fourth interviews were spaced an average of 4.97 
(SD = 4.43) days apart to accommodate the VSSC procedures. For the vast majority of children 
the delay between the first and second, and third and fourth interviews, were each within 2-5 
days. However, due to absences and school closings some children had longer delays between 
interviews. All interviews were conducted in quiet rooms at children’s schools. The interviewer 
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 and child sat across from each other at a child-sized table or on the floor for each interview. 
Children were offered breaks between tasks as needed. 
Visit 1. The first visit consisted of a 1-5 minute warm-up to help the child feel 
comfortable and to add to the estimate of language skills. Next, children participated in a staged 
event. The primary experimenter excused herself, leaving the child alone in the interview room. 
At this point a confederate entered the room, introduced herself to the child and engaged the 
child in a series of brief tasks including reading a book, playing “Simon Says”, and interacting 
with toys (see Appendix B). Finally, the confederate picked up a battery-operated toy that was 
left in plain sight and pushed the button that should activate the toy. When the toy did not work, 
the confederate said “…hmm, I better take it. Don’t tell anybody, okay”. After the child 
consented, the confederate left the room and the experimenter returned. Next, the interviewer 
asked the child about what occurred in her absence by asking the child “So, what happened while 
I was out of the room just now?” and following up with open-ended prompts such as “what else” 
and “please tell me one more thing”. Finally, the interviewer asked children closed-ended 
questions which included some leading questions (see Appendix C). After the target event 
children were tested with the TOLD-P:4 subcomponents. The warm-up conversation and the 
interview about the staged event were audio recorded.  
 Visit 2. During the second visit children were interviewed about the staged event again. 
As after the original event, interviewers asked open-ended questions about the event and 
followed up with the same battery of closed-ended questions and the interview was audio-
recorded. Next, children completed the subtests of the WPPSI-III. 
 Visit 3. The third visit was not temporally linked to the first or second visit except that it 
occurred within the same general testing period, within the 3 weeks surrounding the other 
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 interviews. During this visit children completed the CMS core tests and watched the five-minute 
video from the VSSC.  
 Visit 4. During the final visit children completed the VSSC interview, answered the 
forensic memory questions, and were thoroughly debriefed. The Forensic Memory (FM) 
interview was audio-taped and the interviewer also made note of whether the child noted 
information falling into the categories of “who”, “what”, “when”, “where”, and “why” about the 
event. If the child did not address each of these categories in his or her open-ended response, the 
interviewer prompted the child with a question from the neglected category(ies). For example, if 
a child discussed his or her birthday, but failed to mention anyone who was present, the 
interviewer might ask “Who was with you on your birthday”.  
 In the debriefing phase the interviewer explained that she learned she made some 
mistakes when interviewing the child. She then listed all of the leading items from the staged 
event interviews and from the VSSC interview and provided the correct responses. Finally, she 
said “remember that toy that I couldn’t find before? It turns out that [confederate name] had it 
the whole time! She just took it so she could fix it for me. Wasn’t that a nice surprise” and 
presented the working toy to the child to interact with.  
Table 1. Visit Descriptions 
    
Visit 1 Description Visit 2 Description Visit 3 Description Visit 4 Description 
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Target Event Recall. Children’s open-ended responses were coded for the number of 
correct person, action, object, and descriptive details recalled as well as for commissions in those 
categories. Commissions were incorrect elements that children spontaneously added into their 
event narratives. Closed-ended responses were coded for the number of correct person, action, 
and object details and for both commissions and omissions of event components. For example, if 
a child was asked “What was the name of the little bear in the book?” they would receive credit 
for a correct person detail if they responded “Bartholomew”, a commission of a person detail if 
they responded “Bob”, and an omission of a person detail if they responded “I don’t remember”. 
An additional code was included when coding children’s responses at the second time point. A 
“shift” score was applied in cases where a child’s response in the second interview changed from 
his or her response during the first interview. Shifts were further categorized into shifts to correct 
responses (from incorrect responses) and shifts to incorrect responses (from correct responses).  
VSSC. The VSSC was scored with a coding scheme developed by Memon and Holliday 
(2006), which is based on Scullin’s original coding scheme (Scullin & Ceci, 2001; Scullin & 
Hembrooke, 1998; Scullin, Kanaya, & Ceci, 2002). Correct items were scored as relating to 
persons, objects, actions, or surroundings. Children received one point for each correctly recalled 
item.  
Forensic Memory. Children’s responses to the four forensic memory topics were coded 
for inclusion of “who”, “what”, “when”, “where”, and “why” details. If a response addressed a 
category at least once, the child received a score of one for that category. Therefore, children’s 
scores could range from 0-5 for each memory topic. Because interviewers were instructed to give 





categories interviewers prompted before the child provided a spontaneous answer were also 
coded. They interviewer score could also range from 0-5 for each memory topic. Finally, a 
Forensic Memory Ratio was calculated by dividing the child’s score (+1) by the interviewer’s 
score (+1). Therefore, total child and interviewer prompt scores could each range from 0 to 20 
and Forensic Memory ratio scores could range from 0.05 ((0+1)/(20+1)) to 21 ((20+1)/(0+1).   
Reliability. Two independent coders coded approximately 20% of the transcripts for each 
task. Cohen’s Kappa for Target Event Recall was .98, p < .001 and for the closed-ended section 
it ranged from .85 to .96, all p-values < .001. There was perfect agreement on the VSSC Open-
Ended section, and for Forensic Memory Kappas ranged from .77 to .95 for child codes and from 
.63 to .92 for interviewer codes, all p-values < .001.  Disagreements were discussed until final 







 Preliminary analyses revealed that there were no relationships between child gender, 
interviewer, delay between first and second interview, or delay between third and fourth 
interview, and any of the variables of interest. Gender, interviewer, and interview delay variables 
were excluded from the remaining analyses.  Overall, children in the sample provided high ratios 
of correct to incorrect details. Sixty-seven percent of the 3-year-olds, 78% of the 4-year-olds, and 
71% of the 5-year-olds in the sample provided more accurate than inaccurate details in their 
open-ended responses at the second time point.  Fifty-six percent of the 3-year-olds, 79% of the 
4-year-olds, and 75% of the 5-year-olds provided more accurate than inaccurate details in their 
closed-ended responses at the second time point.  
For several of the following analyses backward stepwise regressions were conducted to 
reveal the most minimal models that would predict the accuracy of children’s memory reports. 
Language and memory variables are generally analyzed separately both to increase statistical 
power in each model and because language and memory are considered separate competencies in 
the legal system (Myers, 1997).  
Language and Accuracy Ratio 
Backward stepwise regressions were conducted predicting the ratio of children’s correct 
(+1) to incorrect (+1) at the second time point. Child age in months, raw scores for VIQ (VI), 
RV, and SU, and Forensic Language were included as predictors in the original model for each 
analysis. The two raters’ estimates of children’s receptive language, r = .34, p < .01, and 
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 productive language, r = .30, p < .05, were correlated and all four scores (two raters, two 
measures each) were summed to form the Forensic Language variable.  
At the final step of the regression predicting children’s Open-Ended Accuracy Ratios 
only VI remained, and it explained 16% of the variance in children’s scores (R2 adjusted = 14%). 
The overall relationship was significant, F(1, 62) = 11.41, p = .001. With other variables 
removed, Open-Ended Accuracy Ratio scores were positively related to VI, increasing by .12 
(SE = .04) for each unit increase in VI.  
As with the open-ended model, in the model predicting children’s performance on the 
closed-ended questions only VI remained at the final step with one high-influence outlier 
removed (Cook’s distance > 1). The final model explained 30% of the variation in children’s 
Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios (R2 adjusted = 28%). The overall relationship was significant, 
F(1, 61) = 25.49, p < .001. With other variables removed, Closed-Ended Accuracy scores were 
positively related to VI, increasing by .03 (SE = .01) for each unit increase in VI.  
Memory and Accuracy Ratio 
Next, regressions were conducted with age, CMS, the VSSC Open-Ended response score, 
VSSC Suggestibility score, and Forensic Memory ratio as predictors. The Forensic Memory ratio 
for the Breakfast event was correlated with Yesterday, r = .59, p < .001 and Summer, r = .35, p < 
.05, but not Birthday, r = .193, p = ns. The Forensic Memory ratio for Yesterday was correlated 
with Summer, r = .33, p < .05, but only marginally correlated with Birthday, r = .26, p = .08. The 
Forensic Memory ratio for Summer was the only variable that was significantly correlated with 
Birthday, r = .28, p < .05. It is likely that the variation in temporal proximity between children’s 
birthdays and the interview explains the inconsistent relationship between the Birthday Forensic 
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 Memory variable and the Forensic Memory ratio for other events.  The four events were 
collapsed to create one Forensic Memory ratio that was used for all of the following analyses.  
In the final step of the regression predicting children’s open-ended responses only CMS 
remained as a predictor. The overall relationship was significant, F(1, 56) = 11.04, p < .01. With 
other variables removed, Open-Ended Accuracy scores were positively related to CMS scores, 
increasing by .09 (SE = .03) for every point increase in a child’s CMS score. The final step of the 
model explained 17% of the variation in children’s Open-Ended Accuracy Ratios (R2 adjusted = 
15%). 
In contrast, the Open-Ended and Suggestibility components of the VSSC were the sole 
predictors remaining at the final step of the regression model predicting Closed-Ended Accuracy 
Ratios, F(2, 55) = 4.50, p < .05. With other variables removed, Closed-Ended Accuracy scores 
were positively related to VSSC Open and negatively related to VSSC Suggestibility, increasing 
by .03, SE = .01 for every extra detail recalled in the VSSC Open, and decreasing by .03, SE = 
.01 for every extra unit of suggestibility. The effect of VSSC Open was significant, t(55)  = 2.55, 
p < .05, and the effect of VSSC Suggestibility was marginal, t(55) = 1.79, p = .08.  Children who 
remembered higher numbers of correct details about the birthday party video and children who 
were less suggestible, had higher ratios of correct to incorrect details in their closed-ended 
responses about the staged event. The final model explained 14% of the variability in Closed-
Ended Accuracy Ratio scores (R2 adjusted = 11%). 
Full Model 
Finally, two regressions were run- one predicting children’s Open-Ended Accuracy 
Ratios with the all variables from the final steps of the relevant language and memory 
regressions above, and one predicting children’s Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios with all the 
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 variables from the final steps of  the Closed-Ended language and memory models above. For 
each model, language variables were entered at the first step, and memory variables were entered 
at the second step.  
Table 2 presents the findings for the Open-Ended model. The full model explains 17% of 
the variation in children’s Open-Ended Accuracy Ratios (R2 adjusted = 14%), however, adding 
CMS at the second step did not add to the predictive power of the model, F change (1, 56) = .92, 
p = ns. Verbal Intelligence alone explained 16% of the variance (R2 adjusted = 14%). The pattern 
of findings was similar for the Closed-Ended model (Table 3). Verbal Intelligence alone 
explained 28% of the variation in children’s Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios (R2 adjusted = 26%) 
and the addition of the two VSSC measures did not have a significant influence on the model, F 
change (2, 56) = .79, p = ns. Therefore, while VI and model-specific memory variables can each 
predict children’s accuracy ratios in separate models, the predictive power is not additive.  
Table 2. Full Model Predicting Open-Ended Accuracy Ratio 
  B SE B β 
Step 1    
Constant -.99 1.95  
VI .12 .04 .39** 
Step 2    
Constant -1.67 2.08  
VI .10 .05 .31* 
CMS .03 .03 .96 
 
Note: R2 = .16 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .01 for Step 2, +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Performance Consistency  
 
 Consistency in testimony is another factor that might speak to the accuracy of a child’s 
memory (Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1997; Conte, Sorenson, Fogarty, & Rosa, 1991; Gordon & 
Follmer, 1994; but see Malloy & Quas, 2009; Quas, Davis, Goodman, & Myers, 2007) and has 
been demonstrated to contribute to estimations of children’s testimonial accuracy (Leippe, 
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 Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992, Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989). Overall, the ratio of accurate to 
inaccurate information in children’s open-ended reports shifted significantly from Time 1 (M = 
8.50, SD = 5.63) to Time 2 (M = 5.36, SD = 4.52) so that on average, children were less accurate 
at Time 2, t = 3.72 (63), p < .001, r = .42. However, children’s Time 1 and Time 2 responses 
were highly correlated when correct responses, r = .58, p < .001 and incorrect responses, r = .35, 
p < .01 were considered separately. Children’s accuracy ratios for closed-ended questions were 
consistent between time points, r = .87, p < .001, as were their correct responses, r = .78, p < 
.001, and incorrect responses, r = .75, p < .001.  
Table 3. Full Model Predicting Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratio 
 
  B SE B β 
Step 1    
Constant .30 .27  
VI .02 .01 .52*** 
Step 2    
Constant .43 .36  
VI .02 .01 .48** 
VSSC Open .01 .01 .14 
VSSC Suggestibility -.01 .01 -.08 
 
Note: R2 = .28 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .02 for Step 2, + p < .10, *p <. 05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
To detect individual differences in performance consistency, regressions were conducted 
with measures of accuracy consistency as the outcome variables. For the open-ended section 
these variables consisted of the differences in the number of correct responses and incorrect 
responses between Time 1 and Time 2. The models were run with the directionality of shift 
maintained (ie: positive numbers indicated that children were less accurate at Time 2 and 
negative numbers indicated that children were more accurate at Time 2) and with absolute 
distances between scores at Time 1 and Time 2 (indicating the magnitude of change between 
Time 1 and Time 2).  
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 For the closed-ended questions there were two change variables- shifts from correct to 
incorrect responses and shifts from incorrect to correct responses.  Shifts to incorrect responses 
and shifts to correct responses were not correlated, r = .05, p = ns, so they were considered 
separately. 
Language and Consistency 
All of the following consistency analyses were conducted using backward stepwise 
regressions. The first set of regressions predicted 1) the direction of change and 2) the magnitude 
of change in children’s open-ended responses between Time 1 and Time 2. Increases in SU 
scores were associated with decreases in open-ended correct items recalled from Time 1 to Time 
2 and with the absolute difference in scores between time points. SUexplained 7% of the 
variance in children’s answer shifts between time points, B = .24, SE = .11, F(1, 62) = 4.49, p < 
.05 and 10% of the absolute difference in scores between time points, B = .24, SE = .08, F(1, 62) 
= 8.00, p < .01. There were no relationships between children’s language scores and the change 
in incorrect responses between Time 1 and Time 2.   
The next set of regressions used age and language variables to predict shifts in children’s 
closed-ended responses between Time 1 and Time 2. Only Forensic Language scores remained 
in the final step of the model predicting children’s shifts to correct responses. The regression was 
a poor fit (R2 adjusted = 8%), but the overall relationship was significant, F(1, 62) = 6.12, p = 
.05. With other variables removed, shifts to correct closed-ended responses between Time 1 and 
Time 2 decreased by -.10, (SE = .04)  for each point increase in children’s Forensic Language 
scores.  
RV score was the only variable that remained at the final step predicting children’s shifts 
to incorrect responses between time points. The regression was a poor fit (R2 adjusted = 7%), but 
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 the overall relationship was significant, F(2, 58) = 5.37, p < .05. With other variables removed, 
the number of closed-ended shifts to incorrect responses decreased by .10 (SE = .04) for each 
unit increase in children’s RV scores. 
Memory and Consistency 
Next, backward stepwise regressions were conducted with age and memory variables 
predicting shifts in open-ended responses. None of the variables predicted decreases in correct 
details between time points, but children’s CMS scores did appear to predict the absolute 
difference in correct responses between Time 1 and Time 2.  However, the regression was a poor 
fit (R2 adjusted = 5%), and the overall relationship was only marginally significant, F(2, 57) = 
3.86, p = .05. With other variables removed, the absolute difference between open-ended correct 
responses increased by .06, SE = .03 for each increase in the total points children were awarded 
on the CMS.  
Children’s shifts in incorrect responses to the open-ended prompt were negatively related 
to CMS, F(2, 56) = 5.66, p < .05, but CMS scores explained little variance in shifts in incorrect 
responses (R2 adjusted = 9%). With other variables removed, children’s incorrect responses on 
the open-ended section decreased by .03, SE = .01 between Time 1 and Time 2 for each increase 
in the total points they were awarded on the CMS. None of the variables were associated with the 
absolute difference between incorrect responses between Time 1 and Time 2.  
In the regression predicting shifts to correct responses in the closed-ended section 
between time points VSSC Suggestibility remained as a predictor at the final step. The 
regression explained little variation in children’s shifts (R2 adjusted = 6%), but the overall 
relationship was significant, F(2, 56) = 4.76, p < .05). With other variables removed, children 
had .07, SE = .03 more shifts to correct responses for each unit increase in VSSC Suggestibility. 
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 There was no association with shifts to incorrect responses and any of the variables entered in the 
model.  
Competency Cutoffs 
 The previous analyses have demonstrated the linear relationships between language and 
memory measures and children’s later accuracy. However, competency determinations require a 
cutoff above which a child can be considered competent to testify. To get a sense of which 
language and memory scores are associated with a sufficient level of accuracy, independent t-
tests were conducted on each of the language and memory variables based on an accuracy ratio 
cutoff of 1. In other words, children who provided more accurate information than inaccurate 
information were compared against children who provided an equal number of accurate and 
inaccurate details, or who provided more inaccurate than accurate details.  
In this sample, 31% of children provided either an equal number of correct and incorrect 
details, or more incorrect than correct details in their open-ended reports and 27% of children 
provided equal numbers of correct and incorrect details, or more incorrect details in their closed-
ended reports. In other words, if the acceptable competency cutoff is the ratio of correct to 
incorrect details, 31% of children in the sample were not competent to provide open-ended 
testimony and 27% of children were not competent to answer direct questions. Twenty-seven 
percent of the sample was competent to provide only one form of testimony (open- or closed-
ended) and 15% of the sample was not competent to provide either form of testimony. Children 
who were most accurate in their open-ended responses were older, higher on both of the forensic 
variables, and higher on VIQ, SU, CMS, and VSSC Open. Relational Vocabulary scores were 
marginally higher in the more accurate group (Table 4).  
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 Children who were most accurate in their closed-ended responses had higher scores on 
every language and memory variable except for VSSC Total Suggestibility and Forensic 
Memory Ratio. However, when VSSC Total Suggestibility was broken into its component parts, 
children’s average Yield scores were higher in the lower accuracy group. There was no 
difference in VSSC Shift scores between groups (Table 5).  
Table 4. Age and Language and Memory Variables by Open-Ended Low- vs. High Accuracy 
 
 High Accuracy Ratio Low Accuracy Ratio   
 M (SD) M (SD) t (df) r 
Age 53.93 (6.03)  47.84 (7.37) 3.42 (60)** 0.40 
VI 56.23 (12.88) 43.37 (14.67) 3.47 (60)** 0.41 
RV  7.33 (5.53) 4.47 (5.10) 1.98 (60) + 0.25 
SU  15.86 (6.56) 11.11 (7.43) 2.53 (60)* 0.31 
CMS 85.65 (23.17) 63.74 (20.15) 3.54 (60)** 0.42 
VSSC Open 10.37 (6.79) 6.41 (5.37) 2.11 (58)* 0.27 
VSSC Yield 5.73 (3.63) 6.63 (4.04) .86 (58) 0.11 
VSSC Shift 5.63 (3.71) 4.79 (3.28) .851 (58) 0.11 
For. Lang. 14.51 (3.73) 11.16 (4.18) 3.15 (60)** 0.38 
FM Ratio .91 (.31) .65 (.20) 3.09 (55)** 0.38 
 
Note: p < .10+, p < .05*, p < .01** 
Table 5. Age and Language and Memory Variables by Closed-Ended Low- vs. High Accuracy. 
 
 High Accuracy Ratio Low Accuracy Ratio   
 M (SD) M (SD) t (df) r 
Age 53.72 (6.16) 48.35 (8.43) 2.78 (62)** 0.33 
VI 57.30 (11.97) 37.35 (10.71) 6.05 (62)*** 0.61 
RV  7.38 (5.60) 3.47 (3.97) 2.65 (62)* 0.32 
SU  16.60 (6.18) 9.18 (6.89) 4.12 (62)*** 0.46 
CMS 87.21 (21.63) 58.53 (19.37) 4.84 (62)*** 0.52 
VSSC Open 10.62 (6.74) 5.87 (4.91) 2.51 (62)* 0.30 
VSSC Yield 5.48 (3.55) 7.75 (3.84) 2.16 (60)* 0.27 
VSSC Shift 5.78 (3.89) 5.06 (3.55) .65 (60) 0.08 
For. Lang. 14.23 (3.60) 11.35 (4.78) 2.58 (62)* 0.31 
FM Ratio .86 (.27) .76 (.41) 1.05 (57) 0.14 
 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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 The VIQ, RV, and SU have established norms for the age group tested so next, Chi-
Squares Tests were conducted which examined the influence of language proficiency (above or 
below the 50th percentile) on Open- and Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios (Accuracy Ratio > 1 or ≤ 
1). On average, children scored above the 50th percentile on VIQ t(58) = 3.32, p < .01, below the 
50th percentile on RV, t(62) = 5.35, p < .001, and at the 50th percentile on SU, t(62) = .05, p = ns. 
Children who performed at or above the 50th percentile on the VIQ or RV were no more 
likely than children with low VIQ or RV to provide a high ratio of accurate to inaccurate details 
in response to the open-ended prompt. However, VIQ was associated with Closed-Ended 
Accuracy Ratio, χ2 (1) = 9.20, p < .01.  The odds ratio indicated that children were 6.05 times 
more likely to have a high Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratio if they were at or above the 50th 
percentile on the VIQ. Relational Vocabulary was also associated with the Closed-Ended 
Accuracy Ratio,  χ2 (1) = 5.25, p < .05. Children with RV scores above the 50th percentile were 
5.56 times more likely to also have high Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios. SU was related to both 
Open-, χ2 (1) = 5.07, p < .05, and Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios, χ2 (1) = 12.33, p = .001. 
Children who were above the 50th percentile on SU were 3.55 times more likely to have high 
Open-Ended, and 8.5 times more likely to have high Closed-Ended Accuracy Ratios, compared 
with children who had SU scores below the 50th percentile.   
Using the cross tabulation of the verbal scores and accuracy ratios we can assess how 
many children would be incorrectly classified as competent or incompetent when using the 
above cutoffs for language proficiency and testimonial competency.  Using children’s VIQ 
percentiles, 16.7% of children in the sample would have been incorrectly excluded from 
providing closed-ended testimony and 10% would be incorrectly classified as competent to 
provide closed-ended testimony.  Using the 50th percentile of RV as a cutoff, 42.2% of the 
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 sample would be incorrectly excluded from providing closed-ended testimony and 3.1% would 
be incorrectly deemed competent. Finally, if the 50th percentile of SU scores was used as the 
competency standard, 22.6% of the sample would have been incorrectly excluded from providing 
open-ended testimony, 20.3% would have been incorrectly excluded from providing closed-
ended testimony, 11.3% would be incorrectly found competent to provide open-ended testimony 





Figure 1. Number of Children by Language Percentile Group and Report Accuracy Group 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
DISCUSSION 
The first hypothesis of the present study was that language and memory variables that are 
used in developmental research could predict the accuracy of children’s later statements about a 
staged event. The second was that these empirical measures of language and memory would 
predict children’s performance better than the types of questions typically asked by courts to 
establish children’s testimonial competency. The results of this study provided substantial 
support for the hypotheses. Several of the empirical measures predicted the ratio of accurate to 
inaccurate details in children’s open- and closed-ended responses. There was not much evidence 
that the types of questions currently used in courts to determine linguistic and mnemonic 
competency could predict the accuracy of children’s reports.  
In the first set of analyses children’s verbal intelligence scores predicted the accuracy of 
their open- and closed-ended reports.   Children’s Memory Scale scores predicted the accuracy 
of their open-ended responses and the open-ended section of the VSSC as well as the VSSC 
Suggestibility score predicted children’s accuracy when answering mildly leading closed-ended 
questions. In line with the second experimental hypothesis, neither the forensic language 
questions nor the forensic memory questions predicted the accuracy of children’s responses.  
The findings indicating a link between children’s language skills and memory accuracy is 
in line with previous work (Kulkofsky, 2010; Kulkofsky, Wang, & Ceci, 2008). However, 
overall there has been little empirical research examining individual differences which contribute 
to children’s report accuracy, particularly pertaining to general memory abilities.  There is a 
body of related literature which has focused on the individual differences that are associated with 
children’s suggestibility, including the relationships between suggestibility and children’s 
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 performance on language and memory measures (see Bruck & Melnyk, 2004 for a review).  The 
present results are consistent with this literature as well. Bruck and Melnyk (2004) report that 
studies which assess language with a comprehensive measure find a relationship between 
language and suggestibility such that children with higher language scores tend to be less 
suggestible (ie: more accurate).  The WPPSI verbal intelligence score was the most 
comprehensive measure of child language used in the present study and it is therefore not 
surprising that it was the most robust language measure for predicting children’s report accuracy.  
Few studies that have examined the relationship between general memory scores and 
children’s suggestibility found significant relationships between the two (Bruck & Melnyk, 
2004). In line with the previously reported findings about individual differences in suggestibility, 
the comprehensive language variables in the present study explained more of the variation in 
children's report accuracy than did the memory variables. While the CMS, VSSC Open, and 
VSSC Suggestibility did independently predict children’s accuracy, they explained no extra 
variance when VI was included in the model. The weak association between VSSC 
Suggestibility and children’s report accuracy was inconsistent with the limited literature on the 
VSSC.  
Previous work has demonstrated a negative relationship between children’s VSSC 
Suggestibility scores and memory accuracy (McFarlane & Powell, 2002; Scullin, Kanaya, & 
Ceci, 2002). However, the suggestibility component of the VSSC may not have been as robust at 
predicting children’s performance in the present study because the target interviews were not 
very suggestive. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the VSSC open-ended 
component, a non-suggestive portion of the VSSC, was significantly associated with children’s 
performance in the present study, and more strongly related to children’s accuracy than the 
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 suggestive portion of the VSSC.  
Although the language and memory variables significantly predicted the accuracy of 
children’s responses at Time 2, these variables were less consistent at predicting shifts in 
children’s responses between Time 1 and Time 2. Syntactic Understanding and CMS predicted 
both the magnitude of the shift in correct responses and the direction of children’s shifts in 
correct responses. Children with higher SU scores tended to shift toward having fewer correct 
responses at Time 2 and children with higher CMS scores shifted toward having more correct 
responses at Time 2. The Forensic Language variable and VSSC Suggestibility score were 
associated with children’s tendency to shift to correct answers in their closed-ended responses 
and RV scores were negatively associated with children’s shifts to incorrect responses.  
Thus, in the present study it does not appear that individual differences have a clear 
relationship with the consistency of children’s testimony, particularly for closed-ended 
responses. This may be because children’s responses between time points were highly correlated. 
This suggests that the magnitude and direction of change may not have differed much between 
children and time may have had more of an impact on shifts in children’s responses than did 
individual differences.  
These findings are also consistent with literature suggesting that there is no relationship 
between children’s report consistency over time and the accuracy of their reports (Malloy & 
Quas, 2009; Quas, Davis, Goodman, & Myers, 2007).  In the present study the language and 
memory variables were associated with accuracy, but the pattern of association with shifts was 
less clear and less robust. If the consistency of children’s testimony relies more on context than 
on children’s abilities, then it would follow that there would not be a strong relationship between 
consistency and variables predicting testimonial accuracy. However, more research is needed to 
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 examine whether there are stable individual differences in children’s abilities to provide 
consistent testimony.  Future research could also examine whether consistency speaks more to a 
child’s competency, or credibility, or, in line with the arguments made by Quas and colleagues 
(Malloy & Quas, 2009; Quas et al, 2007), perhaps consistency should not be considered when 
evaluating a child’s legal testimony.  
The present study’s findings concerning competency cutoffs supported the first 
hypothesis, that empirical measures of language and memory would predict report accuracy, and 
partially supported the second hypothesis, that the empirical variables would predict children’s 
report accuracy more robustly than would the forensic variables. Children who were deemed 
competent in this study differed from incompetent children on every empirical variable, but they 
also differed somewhat on the forensic variables. The children who could provide more accurate 
than inaccurate details in their open-ended reports tended to be older and higher on VI, SU, 
CMS, VSSC Open, and both forensic variables. They were also marginally higher on RV.  
Children who provided more accurate than inaccurate answers in response to closed-
ended questions were older and scored higher on all four language variables, including the 
forensic language assessment. They also scored higher on CMS and VSSC Open and they were 
less likely to yield to suggestive questions in the VSSC. Although both the forensic language and 
the forensic memory variable were associated with higher open-ended accuracy ratios, the effect 
sizes for the forensic variables were slightly smaller than the effect sizes for Age, VI, or CMS. 
The effect size for the relationship between forensic language and children’s closed-ended 
accuracy ratios was smaller than the effect sizes for VI, SU, and CMS, and comparable to the 
effect sizes for Age, RV, and VSSC Open. These findings are largely compatible with the results 
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 of the original regression analyses in which VI, CMS, and VSSC explained more variance in the 
accuracy of children’s responses than the other language and memory measures.  
Finally, children who were average or above average for the population on the three 
normed tests were more accurate than children who were below average. Children who were at 
or above the 50th percentile on VIQ and RV were more likely to be competent at answering 
closed-ended questions than children who were below the 50th percentile. Children at or above 
the 50th percentile on SU were more likely to be competent at answering both open- and closed-
ended questions. However, courts may choose to shift the percentile cutoff for these measures to 
adjust acceptable errors. In the present study, by using the 50th percentile on each of the tests as 
the cutoff point, depending on the test used, between 17 and 42% of the sample would have been 
excluded from providing closed-ended testimony, despite providing more accurate than 
inaccurate details in their closed-ended responses. Between 3 and 11% would have been allowed 
to provide testimony and then provided either an equal number of correct and incorrect details, or 
more incorrect than correct details.  
The findings from the present study complement the existing research on children's 
testimonial competency. I know of only two studies which have examined the language and 
memory components of the competency exam. The first focused on creating an exam with 
internal validity with a pilot sample of 17 children, but no attempt was made to measure 
predictive validity (Hansen, 1990). Further, the exam was not compared against current methods 
of competency assessment. The present findings address this gap by assessing predictive validity 
and by comparing the predictive ability of empirical measures with an approximation of the 
predictive power of current methods. In the present study efforts were also made to maintain 
validity and reliability for many of the pilot variables by selecting them from standard cognitive 
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 tests for children.  
 The second study examined a number of child variables including language ability, but 
not general memory skills, as predictors of testimonial performance (Jacobson, 2002). The 
outcome variables for the study included factors relating to the narrative quality of children’s 
responses as well as child demeanor on the stand and case outcome. Because court transcripts 
were examined instead of controlled staged-events, the accuracy of the children’ reports could 
not be directly examined. In fact, the author’s competency ratings had no relationship with case 
outcomes. Consistent with the current study and with the vast majority of existing literature, 
older children provided higher-quality testimony. However, unlike the present study, children’s 
verbal skills were associated only with the confidence children demonstrated on the stand, and 
not with the quality of testimony. This discrepancy is not surprising given that both the verbal 
measures and outcome variables differed between studies. While this in-depth study of children’s 
testimonial abilities provides insight into the qualities of children’s in-court testimony and 
provides high ecological validity, it cannot address the issue of predictive validity.   
 The present work also complements the developing literature on the truth and lie 
components of the competency exam. The pioneering work on children’s truth and lie-telling and 
testimonial competency has demonstrated that the types of questions currently asked to establish 
children's truth-telling competencies are not predictive of children's truth-telling behavior 
(London & Nunez, 2002; Talwar et al, 2002). These studies further suggest that discussing the 
importance of truth-telling with children, and especially, asking children to promise to be 
truthful, are sufficient in increase children's truth-telling behavior (London & Nunez, 2002; 
Talwar et al, 2002). Some initial work has also been done proposing a novel method of assessing 
truth-telling behavior, though as of yet, it has not been validated (Lyon & Saywitz, 1999, 2000). 
45 
 When combined with these findings, the present work can be used to contribute to the policy and 
practice of testimonial competency determinations.  
However, the present study is limited in ecological validity.  Though portions of the 
staged events and some of the interview questions were designed to loosely approximate court 
cases, children were not exposed to the stress and trauma that would normally be associated with 
testifying in court and there is research evidence that suggests that memory for high-stress 
situations is different from memory for low-stress situations (Chen, Zeltzer, Craske, & Katz, 
2000; Bauer, 2004). Further, there were very few children in the sample who were in the bottom 
quartiles of the standardized tests, and most children could provide more accurate than inaccurate 
information about the staged events. Therefore, there were few children from the population of 
interest- those with low testimonial competency. Future research should investigate how the 
language and memory variables from the present research function with actual child witnesses 
and should examine whether the predictive validity of the measures hold up with larger samples 
of children who are low on these measures. The latter research could be particularly useful to the 
majority of courts whose goal is to exclude only child witnesses with very low capacity to 
provide useful testimony.  
Recommendations and Conclusions 
The findings from this study were in line with the gist of competency law. Children with 
higher language and memory abilities were more accurate when providing testimony about a 
series of staged events. However, approximations of the types of questions currently used in 
courts to assess language and memory proficiency were not the most effective measures. The 
raw scores from the WPPSI-III verbal intelligence subtests, a non-leading event memory task, 
and the core tests from the Children’s Memory Scale emerged as the most robust predictors of 
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 accuracy. Based on these initial data it appears that when a child witness’s competency is called 
into question the presiding judge should request that these tests be administered by a trained 
psychologist in order to determine competency. However, more research is needed to pinpoint 
which scores warrant excluding a child from testifying in court.  
These data also speak to the historically controversial question of whether age should be 
considered in competency decisions (Child Victims and Child Witnesses Rights Act, 1990; 
Myers, 1992, Myers, 1997).  While the data replicated the well-established finding that older 
children tend to be more accurate (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993 for a review), some measures 
predicted more variance in children’s performance than did age. In fact, age was excluded in the 
final steps of the primary regression analyses indicating that age did not explain any additional 
variance in children’s responses above the variance explained by the language and memory 
variables.  Additionally, Chi-Square tests indicated that even when children’s language scores 
were standardized to remove the influence of age, children with higher language scores were 
more accurate. Therefore, the present research suggests that child age should not be considered 
when making competency decisions, which is in line with federal law, and the law of most state 
courts (Child Victims and Child Witnesses Rights Act, 1990; Myers, 1992, Myers, 1997).   
Research in the past two decades has begun drawing distinctions between children’s 
performance on traditional tests of testimonial competency and their performance in court.  
These distinctions are both counterintuitive and disturbing. While the present findings support 
competency law as it is written, we argue that the practice of competency determination is both 
unreliable and not valid. The effect of current practice may be that incompetent children are put 
on the stand and competent children miss their opportunity for justice. These effects are 
particularly dangerous in cases of child abuse where the only evidence of abuse usually lies in 
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 children’s testimony. Only in rare cases are other witnesses or physical evidence available (Ceci 
& Bruck, 1995). Unreliable and invalid competence exams could result in the prosecution of 
innocent people on the one hand and under-prosecution of child-abusers on the other hand. The 
present findings, when combined with the work on the truth and lie competent of the competency 
exam, and with future research, have the potential to inform developmental theory and to 
improve the legal system for child victims and witnesses.  
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 APPENDIX A 
Forensic Memory Interview 
1) Tell me about breakfast this morning.  
-Who (Who was there, who made breakfast, etc) 
-What (What did you eat) 
-When (When was breakfast, what did you do just before and after) 
-Where (Where did you eat your breakfast) 
-Why (Why did you eat what you ate, why did you eat at that time) 
 
2) What happened on your last birthday? 
-Who (Who was there, who planned it) 
-What (What did you eat, what did you get for presents, what did you do) 
-When (When is your birthday, what happened just before and after) 
-Where (Where did you have your birthday celebration) 
-Why (Why did you have your birthday where you did, why did you eat what you ate, why did 
you do what you did, why were the people there that were there) 
 
3) What did you do yesterday? 
-Who (Who was there, who made breakfast, etc) 
-What (What did you eat) 
-When (When was breakfast, what did you do just before and after) 
-Where (Where did you eat your breakfast) 
-Why (Why did you eat what you ate, why did you eat at that time) 
 
4) What did you do last summer? 
-Who (Who was there, who did you play with, which grown ups did you spend time with) 
-What (What did you do) 
-When (When did you do things listed above, what order did they happen in) 
-Where (Where did you spend your summer) 





“Hi [child name]! I’m [confederate name]. I’m here to play some games with you while we’re 
waiting for [interviewer].” 
1) “I brought this book for us to read together. Let’s do that first.” 
[read the book I Love you Just the Way you Are (1998)] 
2) “Okay, how about a game of ‘Simon Says’? Do you know how to play that game? I tell 
you to do silly things, but you only do them if I say ‘Simon Says’ first. Like, if I said 
‘[child’s name] touch your nose’ would you do it? [That’s right! You wouldn’t!] or 
[Actually, you wouldn’t because I didn’t say ‘Simon Says’] What if I said ‘Simon says 
jump up and down’? [That’s right! You’d jump up and down since I said ‘Simon Says’] 
or [Actually, you would jump up and down because I said ‘Simon Says’]. Great, let’s try 
it!” 
a. “Simon Says put on this tee-shirt” 
b. “Touch your cheeks” 
c.  “Simon says throw me the ball” 
d. “Stomp your feet” 
e. “Simon says take off the tee-shirt” 
f. “Clap your hands” 
g. “Simon says do a silly pose for the camera” [confederate pretends to take child’s 
photo with a play camera] 
“Good job!” 
3) “Let’s look at some of the toys in here.” 
a. “This one looks like a fire truck, neat, you can drive it around and pretend to fight 
fires!” 
i. Action: roll the truck around and make fire truck noises 
b. “And this one is a doll. Look at this, you can take her dress on and off and play 
dress up.” 
i. Action: lift the doll’s dress up and down 
c. “Wow, look at this one, it looks like you can push this button and it will do 
something.”  
i. Action: push button 
“Hmm, I guess it’s broken, I better take it. Don’t tell anybody, okay?  
ii. Wait for child to agree (or disagree). If the child does not agree say 
“please?” 
iii. If the child still doesn’t agree, skip ahead.  
“I had a great time playing with you, bye [child’s name]!” 
 APPENDIX C 
 
Staged Event Interview 
 
“Hi again [child’s name]. So, what happened while I was out of the room just now?” 
*follow up with long pauses, and if needed, open-ended prompts such as “what else”, “what else 
can you tell me”, “please tell me one more thing”, “how about one more thing?” 
 
Closed-ended 
“[Confederate name] told me about some of the things she did with you, so next I’m going to ask 
you some questions about that” 
1) What was the name of the little bear in the book? [Ba/Bartholomew] 
2) What was the name of the big bear in the book? [George] 
3) What was wrong with the little bear’s porridge? [too lumpy] 
4) Did the little bear have a bath? [yes] 
5) Did the big bear help the little bear brush his teeth? [no] 
6) Did little bear give big bear a kiss? [yes] 
7) What did the little bear do when he got lost? [leading- he didn’t get lost] 
8) Did the little bear talk to his friend Bill? [leading- there was no character named Bill] 
9) What kind of clothing did you put on during Simon Says? [blue teeshirt] 
10) What did you do with the ball? [threw it to experimenter] 
11) What did you do with your feet? [confederate asked them to stomp, but didn’t say ‘Simon 
Says’] 
12) Did you touch your cheeks? [didn’t say ‘Simon Says’] 
13) Did someone ask you to stomp your feet? [yes] 
14) Did someone ask you to take off some clothes and pose for a picture? [yes] 
15) What color was the hat [confederate] asked you to put on? [leading- child wasn’t asked to 
put on a hat] 
16) Did [confederate] ask you to touch your toes? [no] 
17) What was the first toy you played with after 'Simon Says'? [fire truck] 
18) What was the doll wearing? [pink dress] 
19) What happened when you pushed the button on the last toy? [nothing- it was broken] 
20) Did someone make fire truck noises? [yes] 
21) Did someone lift up the doll’s clothes? [yes] 
22) Did someone ask you to keep a secret? [yes] 
23) What did you do with the toy monkey that was in the room? [leading- there was no 
monkey] 
24) Did [confederate] show you the jump rope? [no, leading- there was no mention of a jump 
rope] 
25) Do you know what happened to the Tigger toy? Where did it go? [the confederate took it, 
but asked the child not to tell] 
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